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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the nature and degree of control which powerful actors have over 
the process of issue definition. In particular, it explores the ways in which knowledge and 
time can mediate, condition and direct decision-makers’ attention from one definition to 
another. The characterisation of the ‘pecking order’ is introduced to capture the process 
of re-definition around the biotech product bovine somatotrophin (rbST) in the European 
Union (EU). The movement of different interpretative dimensions of rbST up and down 
the pecking order is analysed through a synthesis of Haas’s work on epistemic 
communities and Pierson’s on issue feedback and conjunctures. This yields six 
propositions explaining the manner in which interpretations were prioritized and re-
shuffled across the issue’s lifespan. It is concluded that knowledge and time mediate 
choice by presenting decision-makers with opportunities to further their strategic aims 
and also, on occasion, by exerting independent force – particularly where knowledge is 
under development or an issue is caught up in a complex web of linkages. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The study of issue definition has a distinguished pedigree in political science. The early 
pluralist bias of the literature has given way to an increasing number of studies in which 
the role of powerful actors in issue definition is finessed. In particular, the interceding 
forces of knowledge and time are reaching an increasing level of sophistication. 
Following this tradition, this article presents an account of issue definition in the 
European Union (EU) – exploring the nature and influence of epistemic and temporal 
forces upon the degree of control policy actors enjoy over issue definition. An analytical 
framework – a hybrid of Haas’s epistemic communities and Pierson’s work on feedback 
and conjunctures – is deployed to trace the many definitions which became attached to 
the genetically modified milk aid bovine somatotrophin (rbST) in the EU across the 
1980s and 1990s. The definitional journey of rbST is characterised by the idea of a 
temporally contingent ‘pecking order’ where supranational institutional actors engaged 
with the various pieces of knowledge around rbST to determine what mattered in the 
regulation of this substance and when. This yields six observations concerning the nature 
and power of the epistemic and temporal forces which mediate the issue definition 
process and condition decision-makers’ control over it. The article demonstrates that 
while policymakers do have the ultimate power to determine an issue’s definition, over 
time forces related to knowledge development and issue linkage may have considerable 
independence in shaping these choices. 
 
The article proceeds as follows. Section one locates the article in the issue definition 
literature and unpacks the idea of the ‘pecking order’. Section two introduces the 
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empirical case and the Haas-Pierson analytical framework. In section three the empirical 
case study of rbST in the EU is detailed and used to explore the nature of the definitional 
pecking order. The results of this are reported in section four which outlines six 
propositions to explain the manner in which interpretations were placed and re-shuffled 
on the pecking order. The article concludes that while policymakers have the ultimate 
power to determine an issue’s definition, over time endogenous forces – in particular 
those relating to knowledge development and issue linkage – may have considerable 
independence in shaping these choices. 
 
1. ISSUE DEFINITION AND THE DEFINITIONAL PECKING ORDER 
Early studies of issue definition were underpinned by a pluralist focus, where the 
‘definition of alternatives’ (Schattschneider 1975 [1960]: 66), in terms of policy 
solutions, was the ultimate prize up for grabs and issue definition characterized as a zero-
sum game generating winners and losers. Over the past three decades this power 
approach has been tempered by studies adopting a more nuanced approach focussed upon 
the actual manner in which problems are defined and re-defined (Dery 1984; 
Hisschemoller and Hoppe 19952; Rochefort and Cobb 1994) and agendas controlled 
(Cobb and Elder 1975; Cox and McCubbins, 2005). More recently, the notion of issue 
definition as an iterative process has been developed further – with the role of knowledge 
in the expansion or contraction of Schattschneider’s ‘scope of conflict’ problematised 
(Fischer 2003; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Rein and Schön 1994; Stone 1989) and the 
importance of temporal forces in which definitions prevail over others re-discovered 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). 
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The central aim of this article is to contribute to the ongoing enquiry of asking what 
matters and when in issue definition. Issue definition is viewed as a process in which 
decision-makers’ choice are mediated. This paper gauges the extent to which powerful 
policy actors are actually able to control the definition and re-definition of an issue with 
particular consideration given to the role of knowledge and timing in conditioning and 
bounding these choices. Here an issue’s substantive and temporal make-up are conceived 
of as more than simply goods at the disposal of interest-based policy actors with a policy 
solution to promote and policy actors not merely instrumental processors or political 
exploiters of information. 
 
The aim is not simply to bring knowledge and timing centre stage but to dissect them as 
variables. In this way the substance of the definitions which can become attached to 
issues across time, and the junctures at which these evolve and modify, are examined 
forensically. It is worth emphasising that the approach taken here is far from apolitical. 
Few would argue against the fact that policy choices are the bottom line in policy-making 
and that political actors are the main players in issue definition. These are taken as 
givens. However, by directing attention to the knowledge which is used by policy actors 
to define an issue and pin-pointing the timing of these choices the research presented here 
enables close scrutiny of the control that policy actors exert. 
 
The article maps this process of re-definition across time by deploying the ‘pecking 
order’ characterisation. Any given issue may be defined across multiple dimensions. This 
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polymorphic and polytypic potential enables policymakers to choose the dimension they 
wish to focus attention on over another. The definitional ‘pecking order’ assumes a local 
rationality: at any given point and in any given place one definition may be higher than 
others on the pecking order of an issue. Thus, the order is fluid and can be a repository 
for an unlimited number of definitions. Definitions will move up, down or remain 
stationary according to the attention that powerful policy actors afford them. This article 
presents an analytical framework to map the movement of these definitions on the 
pecking order across time, examining the way in which decision-makers engage with and 
react to forces of knowledge and time to promote a favoured definition. 
 
2. THE EMPIRICAL CASE AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This article presents a detailed account of issue definition where the definitions political 
actors attached to an issue are examined primarily through the knowledge types and 
components that exist around the issue itself. More specifically, it discusses the case of 
the agricultural yield enhancer bovine somatotrophin (hereafter rbST) in the EU. Analysis 
is informed by a ‘process-tracing’ approach (Berman 2001; George 1997) with the 
account informed by actors’ perceptions of rbST reconstructed using interview data3 and 
official documentation. This issue’s definitional journey spanned over a decade from 
1987 when the first license applications were made until 1999 when the EU formally 
banned its production and marketing. However, this brief summary belies a highly 
complex story. 
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rbST is a genetically modified milk aid. In short, bovine somatotrophin is a naturally 
occurring substance that, with the advent of biotechnology in the 1970s in the United 
States (US), could be synthetically produced for the mass market of dairy farmers. After 
an extensive empirical product evaluation by the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), rbST was approved in 1993. The contrast in rbST’s fortunes in the EU could not 
have been starker. The product’s launch coincided with the introduction of milk quotas 
and widespread concern in Europe with the use of hormones in meat. This unfavourable 
climate ensured that rbST was never likely to be licensed. Moreover, with no 
Community-level risk assessment protocol, rbST emerged into a regulatory vacuum 
where scientific evaluation gave way to political debate and socioeconomic imperatives. 
 
Though rbST was subject to various re-definitions at no point did these changes trigger or 
reflect any change in the preferred policy solution. So why bother to dig any deeper? If 
the policy decision did not alter, then any change in rbST’s definition may appear 
inconsequential. The view taken here is that the rbST case illustrates that in issue 
definition there can be more at stake than policy decisions. As an archetypal ‘trans-
scientific’ issue (Weinberg 1972), rbST furnished EU policymakers with a considerable 
set of definitional options from which to pick at any one time providing an excellent 
exemplar of how pecking order analysis might operate. Allied to this, the EU’s firm 
policy stance muffled the pluralist bargaining noise around rbST significantly. This 
enables the isolation of knowledge and time inputs, bringing into relief their role as goods 
to be exploited by decision-makers and also their capacity to, on occasion, bound 
decision-makers choices in ways they do not entirely choose. 
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Conceptually, analysis is informed by two approaches. The first of these is Peter M. 
Haas’s epistemic communities framework (Haas 1992). More specifically, the 
conceptualization of knowledge found in Haas’s work is used to illuminate the multi-
dimensional nature of issues. Haas breaks down knowledge as a policy input into the 
constitute parts that go into the definitional mix of an issue, conceptualizing knowledge 
as comprised of four components: normative and principled beliefs; substantive notions 
of cause and effect; empirical notions of validity, and practical policy proposals (Haas 
1992: 3). 
 
Taken together these components represent the belief system around which amalgams of 
transnational experts or ‘epistemic communities’ can form, thus fostering international 
policy co-ordination. The analysis presented here dispenses with the ‘anthropomorphic’ 
(Radaelli 1997: 169) aspect of the thesis. While groups of experts undoubtedly deliver 
knowledge to the policy process (particularly in the technocratic EU) and can be 
significant players therein, the search for such a community is not the aim of the research 
presented here. 
 
Rather, the focus is on the knowledge inputs to issue definition, with Haas’s four 
epistemic components serving a heuristic purpose. Zooming-in on these enables an 
accurate identification of the pieces of evidence that captured EU decision-makers’ 
attention and moved up the pecking order. Focusing upon the nuts and bolts of an issue’s 
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evaluative dimensions also enables us to identify any instances where knowledge itself 
pushed decision-makers into reactive positions and in doing so altered the pecking order. 
 
Issue definition does not take place in a vacuum; definition formation is an interactive 
process interceded by policies and events from the past, present and in the anticipated 
future. Shifts in an issue’s definitional pecking order must also be seen as temporally 
contingent. The fact that time matters in the policy process is not, of course, a new 
discovery. Scholars from policy studies (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Lindblom 1968) 
and International Relations (IR) (Stern and Sundelius 19924) have long known the 
importance of feedback and sequencing in issue definition. This article follows this logic, 
foregrounding the timing of definition and re-definition to uncover why certain pieces of 
knowledge about rbST were privileged and moved up the pecking order, while others 
were passed over or relegated. 
 
These temporal dynamics are explored, and the definitional pecking order explained, 
using Paul Pierson’s work on the role of feedback loops (both positive and negative) and 
event conjunctures in politics (Pierson 2000). Three of Pierson’s main arguments inform 
analysis: 
1. Self-reinforcing sequences – Pierson draws on the work of economist Brian 
Arthur (1994 in Pierson 2000) concerning positive feedback and increasing 
returns. The hypothesis presented is a simple one where ‘initial moves in a 
particular direction encourage further movement along the same path’ (Pierson 
2000: 74). Thus an initial position can set the trajectory for the future. 
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2. Non-reinforcing dynamics – Pierson notes that the influence of past events can 
also be negative, stimulating a chain reaction that may go against the original 
grain or involve some form of adaptation to ensure that an original goal is met. 
3. Historical conjunctures and critical junctures – Pierson argues that events (often 
unrelated) can arrive at the same historical moment interacting to affect the future 
course of political action. This coincidence of events may conspire to produce 
unanticipated events and mark turning points in the political process (Collier 1993 
in Pierson 2000: 87). 
 
Accordingly, analysis of decision-makers choices around rbST is guided by two sets of 
analytical questions. The first concern the knowledge dimension of issue definition: 
1. how do the various knowledge inputs which surround an issue interact to form the 
interpretations that make up an issue’s definitional pecking order? 
2. how much agency does knowledge itself have relative to policymakers in 
dictating the undulations of an issue’s definitional pecking order? 
 
The impact of feedback and conjunctures is examined through two questions relating to 
both endogenous and exogenous forces found in the policy process: 
1. what forces generate feedback sufficient to influence an issue’s definitional 
pecking order? 
2. can apparently unrelated issues or events alter the pecking order or even the 
definitional path of an issue? 
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3. rbST’S DEFINITIONAL PECKING ORDER IN THE EU 
While the policy decision was fixed from the start rbST’s definition was not; with the 
decision to prohibit the substance becoming the object of a range of definitions. This 
section outlines rbST’s definitional narrative in the EU which spanned more than a 
decade. The story is structured chronologically (as far as possible) into three distinct 
definitions phases. In each of these, a different element of what was known about rbST 
was pushed to the top of the pecking order – figures 1, 2 and 3 provide schematic 
illustration. 
 
Phase 1: Issue pre-definition and the role of empirical evidence 
As has been intimated, from the outset rbST was perceived in negative terms in the EU. 
The first Commission communication of September 1989 (Commission 1989a) made 
explicit its policy preference to prohibit the use of rbST in the Community. The cause and 
effect logic of rbST was obvious – as a yield enhancer it would boost milk production 
into even greater surplus (Commission 1989b) and de-stabilize the already enervated 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Commission 1989a). 
 
The first definition attached to rbST reflected these economic concerns with the Council 
of Ministers agreeing that any consideration to license its use should be suspended until 
after an ‘assessment period’. During this time – which was extended until December 
1991 – a programme of socioeconomic assessments confirmed the Commission’s worst 
fears (Commission 1992). The CAP, as it stood, could not withstand the introduction of a 
quantitative yield enhancer and it was probable that widespread use of rbST would 
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precipitate the collapse of the milk quota regime. As a result, a moratorium was placed on 
rbST timed to coincide with the first assessments of the Community’s milk quotas at the 
end of 1993. 
 
A standard study of issue definition might well stop at this point. The policy definition–
policy solution link was clear and left little scope for political bargaining. In such 
circumstances issue re-definition appeared unlikely and moreover inconsequential. 
Indeed, while there was lobbying from the biotech and veterinary product groups based in 
Brussels and Washington they were well aware that the task of changing the 
Community’s policy stance was tantamount to turning around a juggernaut. However, 
with the luxury of hindsight, it is known that rbST stayed on the formal agenda in the EU 
for more than a decade, and while the policy decision never faltered, the issue’s definition 
did change in both subtle and dramatic ways. 
 
Here these changes are illuminated through a deeper examination of what was known 
about rbST before the first economic definition came to predominate. By unpacking the 
issue’s past in this way many other interpretations of rbST are found to have been in 
circulation and a definitional ‘pecking order’ discerned (see figure 1 for a summary). 
 
The European Parliament (EP) placed rbST on the formal agenda. More specifically, the 
Parliament’s Agriculture and Environment Committees insinuated themselves into the 
gap left by the absence of statutory Community-wide system to regulate either veterinary 
medicinal or biotech products. These committees were quick to include the milk aid 
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within their wider investigation of ‘agricultural production aids’ which had been ongoing 
since 1980. In March 1988, the results were published in a two-volume report (EP 1988a, 
1988b). On rbST, two categories of concern dominated. The first asked questions of 
economic need and, at a more fundamental level, normative questions asking whether or 
not the Community wanted such a product. The second concerned what was known in 
terms of natural scientific evidence about the safety of rbST. 
 
The arguments rehearsed in the EP committees are worth examining. They reveal the 
multiple knowledge types of which rbST was comprised and, accordingly, the variety of 
definitions which made it onto the original pecking order. It is this set of interpretations 
which was juggled by policymakers throughout the rest of the issue’s lifespan. 
 
Taking the questions of need and want first, two knowledge elements were conjoined. 
While the economic case against rbST dominated the Parliament’s view, allied to this 
were normative concerns. The committees’ reports, a parliament debate and an early 
‘own initiative’ report (EP 1988a, 1988b, 1986 respectively) all stressed that even if rbST 
did not break the milk quota regime its introduction would demand a fundamental 
restructuring of the Community dairy sector5 incommensurate with the rural ‘European 
way of life’ (EP 1988a) and the Community’s Treaty of Rome obligations within the 
CAP to ‘safeguard the ... traditional agricultural structure and their economies of scale’ 
(Article 39 in EP 1988a). 
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The scientific evidence on rbST, and its safety for consumers, was also examined by the 
Parliament’s committees (EP 1988a, 1988b). The Environment Committee gave 
particular attention to the concerns of one US public health expert. Veteran campaigning 
scientist Dr Samuel Epstein challenged manufacturers with the theory that rbST would 
stimulate the production of a compound called insulin growth factor-1 (IGF-1) in milk 
which, if consumed in large quantities over time, is associated with various cancers in 
humans (Epstein 1988). The committee’s report acknowledged that the IGF-1 thesis was 
based upon an untested hypothesis, with only a little conjectural evidence to substantiate 
it, and was not supported by the empirical consensus constructed around the 
manufacturers proprietary evidence that rbST was safe for humans. However, this lack of 
hard evidence did not prevent it emphasizing the importance of consumers’ potential 
perceptions of safety, even in the absence of empirical actuality. 
 
In the Commission, DG III for Industry6 (DG Industry hereafter) followed suit. While the 
IGF-1 thesis was mentioned in its first communication, the human health definition was 
presented as relevant by virtue of the more socially informed theme concerning consumer 
perception. It was in this trans-scientific form that this empirical evidence was granted 
pecking order status – albeit at a low level. 
 
A similar interpretation was set by the Parliament’s Environment Committee with regard 
to the evidence that rbST might have a deleterious impact upon the administered animals. 
Again the scientific consensus pointed toward product safety. However, some trial data 
did indicate that rbST might increase the mastitis levels in dairy cows, a condition which, 
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in extreme cases, is associated with animal burn out and shortened life expectancy 
(Kronfeld 1987, 1988). 
 
The evidence at that time, though it was certainly firmer than that which existed on IGF-
1, still only amounted to a collection of anomalies. However, again the EP committee and 
then the Commission eschewed using this evidence in its conjectural form, preferring to 
attach to it the normative theme of animal welfare and practical policy concerns about the 
consequences for milk quality should farmers go beyond the recommended dosage. The 
trans-science option was selected, with empirical evidence used only to inform a 
definition of rbST in conjunction with more socially informed themes. 
 
This privileging of trans-scientific arguments is reflected in a debate led by Environment 
Committee chair Ken Collins concerning how to regulate high-tech products, such as 
hormone growth promoters and rbST, which also carry substantial socioeconomic 
implications. Collins argued that rather than be assessed by the standard three scientific 
criteria, concerning product safety, quality and efficacy, a ‘4th hurdle’ be introduced to 
ensure that a product’s risks in socioeconomic and consumer terms be considered in 
decision-making (Collins 1991; EP 1988b, 1989, 1990). 
 
Collins intended this to be a solution that would provide manufacturers with a transparent 
regulatory system. It would also ensure that the Community was not bound to the 
empirical form of risk assessment typified by the US ‘red book’ (National Research 
Council [NRC] 1983) which exhorts deference to scientific consensus regardless of the 
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political implications. The 4th hurdle, though taken seriously within the Commission 
where it was lent credibility through the support of DG Agriculture (Commission 1990), 
was ultimately rejected. This ended the Parliament’s involvement on rbST. DG Industry, 
which had taken the lead on rbST, preferred a far less prescribed approach, arguing that 
in non-routine trans-scientific cases the Commission ‘reserved the right … to take a 
different view in light of its general obligations to take into account other Community 
policies and objectives’ (Commission 1991: 3). 
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Figure 1 
rbST’s Pecking Order 
Phase 1: Issue pre-definition and the role of empirical evidence 
 
 
Socio-economics: substantive, valid 
empirical evidence, normative issues 
and policy problem all related to the 
CAP 
Animal health and welfare: 
normative beliefs and 
substantive conjecture related to 
mastitis 
 
Human health: normative 
beliefs and substantive 
conjecture related to IGF-1 
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Phase 2: Issue re-definition – promoting the normative and empirical 
Despite the dominance of the economic definition of rbST and the fact that the 
moratorium’s continuation beyond 1993 appeared little more than a formality, rbST’s 
definition pecking order was still in motion. The period before the end of 1993 brought a 
re-shuffling of this order with the rise of interpretations concerning animal health – in 
terms of the empirical evidence on mastitis – and rbST’s welfare implications – 
underpinned by normative questions of animal rights and sentience. This change in 
definitional direction was signalled by the DG Industry in 1992 with the request of an 
opinion from the newly formed Groups of Advisers on the Ethical Implications of 
Biotechnology (GAEIB). This body judged rbST to be ethically sound (Commission 
1993b: 3) and the mastitis levels detected to be within an acceptable range. Indeed, the 
only action point related to consumer confidence with the suggestion that, in the interests 
of transparency, manufacturers should look into the possibility of labelling the milk 
yielded via rbST. 
 
Across the Commission, this clean bill of health was unwelcome if not entirely 
unexpected. However, the fact that the animal health and welfare side of rbST were being 
considered in such serious terms is significant in its own right. It reflects the wider view 
evolving within DG Industry regarding the types of knowledge and evidence that might 
inform the regulation of high-tech products. The involvement (and indeed the creation) of 
the GAEIB bolsters the view that a renegotiation of the type of knowledge inputs that 
should be privileged was occurring within the EU at this time. This represents an 
entrenchment of view identified in the first definitional strand of rbST as a trans-
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scientific issue about which it was entirely legitimate to ask non-empirical, normatively 
informed questions, which were underpinned by empirical or substantive facts – be that 
in terms of economics or animal health. 
 
The trigger to this ethical investigation can be found in the 1991 product reviews given 
by the Commission’s competent body the Committee of Veterinary Medicinal Products 
(CVMP) (Commission 1992: Annexes 1 and 2). The CVMP gave rbST the all-clear 
across the three scientific criteria of safety, quality and efficacy. On mastitis it was made 
explicit that while a causal relationship between rbST and increased incidence was 
apparent, this evidence was not firm in case numbers and so lacked validity. Thus rbST 
was deemed safe, with a note of caution on mastitis levels sounded. The CVMP advised 
that dosage control mechanisms be put in place and so guarantee that any incidence of 
mastitis would fall within the normal range by the inclusion of a ‘structured programme 
of pharmacovigilance’ as part of rbST’s licensing package in Europe (Commission 1992: 
6). 
 
DG Industry’s response was swift. Emphasizing the non-binding status of the CVMP’s 
scientific assessment it opted instead to focus upon the management stipulations laid 
down by the CVMP. rbST was increasingly appearing undesirable in health and welfare 
terms but moreover was problematic in management terms (Commission 1992) implying 
‘substantial changes in current management practices’ that would reduce rbST to being 
available by veterinary prescription only (Commission 1992: 6). 
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Thus the normative focus on animal welfare and empirical evidence on mastitis was 
expanded further to include the policy implications of having to monitor the impact of 
rbST upon treated animals. This extension had the effect of raising the barrier against 
rbST higher still. The need to monitor animal health and welfare was presented by the 
Commission as impractical, entailing pharmacovigilance costs which would be 
prohibitively expensive and deracinate the original design of the product (Commission 
1992). This in turn would discourage use of rbST, making it a product without a market. 
 
The elevated position of this combined normative-empirical and policy definition of rbST 
was sealed in the two proposals outlining the case to extend the moratorium until the 
millennium (Commission 1993c, 1993d). In policy terms, this timing was explained as 
coinciding with the second set of milk quota assessment. In definitional terms these 
documents make it clear that the extension of rbST’s ban was not simply on the familiar 
economic grounds. The risk management demanded by rbST’s normative and health 
implications for animals formed the centre-piece of the proposals and, despite the 
CVMP’s distinct lack of equivocation, the Commission recommended further animal 
safety related studies. 
 
After a one-year delay, the moratorium was set until 2000. This promotion of empirical, 
scientific knowledge did not amount to a replacement of the clear economic consensus 
against rbST. The pecking order characterisation suggests that several interpretations and 
definitions can co-exist, where some will inevitably be higher placed than others for a 
time. Thus while the animal health and welfare definition edged into the spotlight in the 
 21 
early 1990s, the economic one had not disappeared from the stage – as figure 2 
illustrates. 
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Figure 2 
rbST’s Pecking Order 
Phase 2: Issue re-definition – promoting the normative and empirical 
 
 
Socio-economics: substantive, valid 
empirical evidence, normative issues and 
policy problem all related to the CAP 
Human health: normative beliefs 
and substantive conjecture related  
to IGF-1 
 
Animal health and 
welfare: normative 
beliefs and 
substantive conjecture 
related to mastitis 
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Phase 3: Issue resolution and the (re)habilitation of scientific evidence 
This boost in the fortunes of scientific, empirical knowledge continued after 1994. And in 
October 1999, when the Commission’s newly empowered DG XXIV for Health and 
Consumer Protection (DG Sanco hereafter) announced its intention to propose a 
permanent ban on rbST (Commission 1999c) this was on the basis of the scientific 
evidence on mastitis and animal welfare and supported by the still conjectural IGF-1 
thesis and doubts it cast over the safety of rbST milk for humans. 
 
The evidence presented by the Commission centred upon the opinions of two newly 
created supranational scientific committees. The first report by the Scientific Committee 
on Animal Health and Animal Welfare (SCAHAW) advised that the evidence on mastitis 
was now sufficiently valid to extrapolate causality and represented the beginnings of a 
scientific consensus (Commission 1999a). The Commission continued to link this 
empirical evidence with the Community’s own normative and policy commitments on 
animal welfare, referring in particular to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam’s Protocol on 
animal welfare expanding supranational competence in this area. The second scientific 
contribution, made by the Commission’s Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures 
Relating to Public Health (SCVPH), concerned what was known about the IGF-1 thesis 
and, in particular, the studies that appeared to add weight to Epstein’s cancer postulate 
(Commission 1999b). While this report acknowledges that the evidence on IGF-1 was 
thin – in terms of both validity and the more basic issue of cause and effect – it concluded 
that additional exploration of the conjectural evidence was required to prove that rbST 
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milk would not stimulate cancers in humans. Given this, rbST should not be licensed for 
use and research on its effects should continue. 
 
In contrast to previous actions in both hormone growth promoters and rbST, the 
Commission adhered to the recommendations of its two scientific committees in their 
entirety. This willingness to push the interpretation of rbST as a threat to human health up 
the pecking order marked a notable departure. Despite the fact that the evidence was 
highly conjectural and contrary to the advice of the Commission’s own product review 
body CVMP (Commission 1992, 1993a, 1999d) and the international scientific consensus 
(Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] 1993; Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on 
Food Additives [JECFA] 1998) DG Sanco deployed a precautionary approach, placing 
the onus on rbST’s manufacturers and the US regulator to prove the negative. 
 
In addition to this use of empirical evidence, the production of these scientific opinions 
marked a totally new form of engagement between the Commission and scientific 
knowledge. The previous two definitional strands indicate that substantive evidence from 
the natural sciences – whether conjectural or consensual – was treated as either beside the 
point or useful only when allied to normative or social knowledge. The movement of this 
natural scientific empirical knowledge up the rbST definitional pecking order was made 
possible by a new suite of scientific committees created within DG Sanco in 1997 in 
response to the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis (Commission 1997). 
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The changed status of empirical evidence in the case of rbST reflects the wider evolution 
in the relationship between the supranational policymakers and scientific evidence. It 
should be noted that this evolution did not amount to a new approach to this knowledge. 
The strict empiricist approach which predominated in the US was not being pursued. 
Rather in the rbST case, in line with the path set by hormone growth promoters, scientific 
opinions were produced and used on DG Industry’s terms. These terms emphasized DG 
Industry’s determination to plough its own furrow in risk assessment – where the trans-
scientific nature of some policy issues makes non-scientific, social and normative 
evidence and arguments as legitimate as ‘hard’ natural scientific data. This rejection of 
the US paradigm is illustrated by one of the 1999 rbST report preambles: ‘risk assessment 
rationale is not simply defined as a technical exercise’, but rather is a ‘task attributed to 
science from society’ (Commission 1999b). 
 
Significantly, these two reports were not simply for EU consumption. They were a key 
part of the Commission’s defence in the long anticipated international trade dispute with 
the USA. In this respect, the Commission used its ongoing experience at the dispute 
settlement proceedings at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over hormone growth 
promoters to guide it in the types of standards that were scientifically justifiable in 
banning rbST. 
 
In 2000 the US signalled that it no longer intended to take the dispute over rbST any 
further. The dénouement toward which the rbST controversy had been working for over a 
decade in the EU did not come and the issue died wi
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1999 the Codex Alimentarius (the United Nations [UN] body which oversees scientific 
standards on foodstuffs) failed to offer a unanimous endorsement of the consensus on the 
safety of rbST milk for humans. Even with the scientific consensus fractured a US 
victory at the WTO over rbST was still likely. However, a successful outcome and 
retraction of the EU ban would not logically follow. By taking the further legal action 
required to challenge EU intransigence the US would have incurred costs 
disproportionate to rbST’s market worth7. 
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Figure 3 
rbST’s Pecking Order 
Phase 3: Issue resolution and the (re)habilitation of scientific evidence 
 
 
 
Socio-economics: substantive, valid 
empirical evidence, normative issues 
and policy problem all related to the 
CAP 
Animal health and welfare: 
normative beliefs and 
substantive conjecture related to 
mastitis 
 
Human health: 
normative beliefs 
and substantive 
conjecture related  
to IGF-1 
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4. EXPLAINING rbST’S PECKING ORDER 
This article awards special attention to the knowledge inputs and interpretations that 
develop around an issue gaining prominence or falling into obscurity over time. A wide 
variety of knowledge components existed around rbST making possible a wide range of 
definitions. Digging deeper into the position occupied by these in the pecking order 
illuminates issue definitions as the products of complex interactions of political power 
with knowledge and time. This final section crystallises some of the key observations 
about the way in which the trade-offs and choices of EU decision-makers were mediated 
by these forces, observations which further pecking order analysis might develop into 
firmer, more specified hypotheses. 
 
The ‘what’: knowledge complexity, component interaction and a trans-scientific 
pecking order 
Observation 1: definitions that appear on the pecking order are commonly amalgams of 
knowledge components constructed by policymakers. Supranational policymakers 
actively engaged with rbST’s knowledge components, expressing their policy preferences 
by making and creating links between the various elements. rbST’s multi-dimensional 
nature offered decision-makers exploitable political opportunities. For example, in the 
face of an early scientific consensus on safety, EU policymakers had the material to 
construct an alternative trans-scientific interpretation which encapsulated the economic 
and normative threats the product posed to the Community. 
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Observation 2: knowledge components may develop independently of political actors, 
forcing decision-makers to react creatively. As has been noted, decision-makers were 
central to the construction of definitions around rbST. However, in certain instances 
knowledge did have the upper hand, in particular mediating the definitional combinations 
which were possible. The knowledge development over mastitis and IGF-1 placed 
decision-makers on the back foot, leaving them to react creatively. For example, on 
mastitis causal empirical postulates could only be used to best definitional effect when 
combined with agreed notions of validity – something which was only possible over time 
as further research was conducted. The importance of this combination is highlighted by 
the fact that, prior to the SCAHAW report, normative concerns were evoked alongside 
the conjectural cause and effect empirical evidence to boost its validity. The evolution of 
mastitis and IGF-1 evidence enabled DG Sanco to re-define not only rbST but also the 
terms of its international engagement on the issue. 
 
The endogenous ‘when’: policy linkages, positive feedback and ‘European standards 
of appropriateness’ 
Observation 3: issue linkages can create pre-definitions and generate positive feedback 
which decision-makers may not always choose though can exploit. That the formal 
agenda contains issues, old and new, between which there are links is not a new 
discovery. This, of course, is the stuff of the ‘crowded policy space’ (Heclo 1975). Here, 
this crowding resulted in the definitional motifs which had developed around one issue 
‘rubbing-off’ on a new inhabitant of this space. While decision-makers engaged with the 
linkages which cut through rbST they did not necessarily always choose them. 
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From the outset, rbST was caught up in a wider sequence of events concerning the form 
which risk assessment should take and in particular the place which natural scientific 
evidence should occupy in any burgeoning supranational regulatory system. A key 
marker of this was the stance taken by the Parliament and Commission to ban hormone 
growth promoters, where a definition based on consumer confidence had been preferred 
to the scientific consensus on safety developed by the Commission’s own group of 
advisers. 
 
The linkage of rbST to the hormones saga was critical in setting policymakers’ ‘cognitive 
mindsets’ (Pierson 2000), pre-defining rbST and setting its future trajectory. More 
specifically, the family resemblance between the issues, their temporal proximity and the 
absence of a regulatory structure enabled the two EP committees and DG Industry to use 
their ready-made expertise and well developed interpretations to build arguments over the 
form which Community risk assessment should take. 
 
Pierson points out that, in such cases, where policymakers have the requisite power to 
construct the ‘standards of appropriateness’ (Mahoney 1997 in Pierson 2000: 77) positive 
feedback is likely to result. The generation of this feedback was typified by the ‘4th 
hurdle’ concept (Collins 1991), the Commission’s April 1991 communication 
(Commission 1991) and the ethical turn in the 1990s marked by the GAIEB enquiry 
(Commission 1993b). This feedback is also indicative of how ‘locked-in’ to the trans-
scientific interpretation of rbST the EU had become. Empirical knowledge (consensual or 
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otherwise) was not, on its own, viewed as offering any ‘viable alternative’ (Pierson 2000: 
609) and was relegated to the lower divisions of the pecking order for much of rbST’s 
early years. 
 
Observation 4: decision-makers can use issue linkages to generate learning that orders 
movement up and down the pecking order. Lessons were also generated as the returns 
increased from hormone growth promoters to rbST (see Arthur 1994 in Pierson 2000: 
76). Both the initial relegation of the scientific evidence and its later rehabilitation 
mirrored precedents set in the hormones controversy. EU decision-makers seized upon 
opportunities to draw lessons. Notably, in the 1997 WTO hormones dispute settlement 
proceedings the Commission’s strategy had been to gather and present its own scientific 
evidence questioning the safety of growth promoters in beef, attaching to these wider 
ethical and social issues. Though defeated in legal terms, the WTO Appellate Body 
conceded that the Community’s risk assessment need not always be restricted to 
empirical evidence as conceived by the USA (WTO 1998). Despite having lost and being 
ordered to pay trade concessions to the US and Canada, the EU was not forced to change 
its position, but rather was to provide more empirical evidence. This production and 
deployment of empirical evidence alongside social arguments was an exemplar for action 
from which the Commission sought lessons and adjusted its own operating procedures to 
build an empirical and social case against rbST for the anticipated international 
showdown. 
 
The exogenous ‘when’: adaptation pressures and critical junctures 
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Observation 5: external expectations can re-focus decision-makers’ attention and alter 
the definitional pecking order over time. Economist Brian Arthur suggests that in the face 
of continuing pressure policymakers will aim to minimize any drawbacks that they 
anticipate their position may incur in the future (1994, in Pierson 2000: 77). The 
sustained US demands that the EU to live up to its WTO commitments to justify the 
decision to ban in scientific terms represents this type of non-reinforcing dynamic. The 
threat of international censure contributed to the Commission’s incremental adaptation of 
its stance, where definitions informed by natural scientific evidence became realigned 
and moved up the pecking order. 
 
While this indicates a definite compromise in the EU’s control over rbST’s definition this 
should not be overstated. The nature of the reaction indicates that the EU used the time it 
had to gradually finesse its stance on empirical evidence around rbST. By exploiting the 
production of new knowledge around mastitis and IGF-1, as well as the Appellate Body’s 
ruling on hormones, the Commission ensured that this negative feedback did not subvert 
its starting point and that the overall thrust to ban rbST’s use remained viable. Thus 
through reaction and forced re-definition decision-makers can still find enough scope to 
defend established policy decisions. 
 
Observation 6: temporally concurrent and seemingly unrelated events can represent 
‘critical junctures’ in the promotion of one definition over another. The lessons drawn 
from the hormone dispute at the WTO and consistent US pressure ensured that the need 
to give empirical evidence a place in rbST’s definition had been gradually internalized in 
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the EU before any threat of international action. And so, the shift in the fortunes of 
empirical science up the pecking order signalled by the 1999 reports was not a sudden 
event. However the Commission’s ability in practical terms to build an internationally 
credible scientific case against rbST owed much to the post-BSE reform of scientific 
advisory system. This (re)organization of scientific advice created, for the first time, a 
supranational infrastructure which could produce empirical evidence guided by terms of 
enquiry set by a DG whose first priority was consumer health. The power to direct 
knowledge interpretation in this way ensured that risk assessment could be conducted 
according to the ‘standards of appropriateness’ prevailing in DG Sanco and the 
Community at large, standards which included trans-scientific as well as empirical 
evidence. 
 
Again this exogenous factor is of a lower order in terms of influence. Commission 
officials and scientific committee members did report that the BSE crisis and institutional 
reform which followed had strengthened their resolve to take a trans-scientific, 
precautionary view in cases like rbST. However, in this case the influence of this reform 
was far greater in terms of the practical facilitation of definitional change as opposed to 
any direct interpretative effect. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It should go without saying that the pecking order moves to a rhythm arranged largely by 
decision-makers. However, by focussing upon powerful actors’ interaction with some of 
the key factors which mediate issue definition, this case illustrates that the power to 
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control where attention is directed and which definitions win-out is not entirely 
unfettered. The re-shuffles of rbST’s definitional pecking order were neither the result of 
uninhibited political will nor were they random uncontrolled events. 
 
Decision-makers must cut their definitional cloth according to their means. The rbST 
case reveals that knowledge and time conditioned these means by providing opportunities 
for purposive engagement and also presenting more compromising situations which 
demanded creative reaction. While the former infers a higher degree of control than the 
latter it does not necessarily follow that purposive engagement by decision-makers will 
always produce more favourable results than unanticipated instances to which decision-
makers must react under pressure. 
 
On purposive engagement – knowledge and time most commonly condition choice by 
presenting decision-makers with exploitable goods with which they can engage in a 
strategic way. The rbST story is replete with examples of where such opportunities were 
taken. In departing from the scientific consensus on safety a trans-scientific definition 
was not simply attended to, rather it was consciously crafted. Similarly, Commission 
officials proved adept at engineering and drawing lessons from the growth promoters 
issue and engaging with exogenous pressures in a manner which secured the EU’s policy 
stance to prohibit rbST, in both interpretative and practical terms. 
 
However, well-placed institutional policy actors may not always have the upper hand. 
This case indicates that while decision-makers create definitions this is not always as they 
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wish8. On occasion, they have to react creatively to ungovernable, unanticipated events – 
in this case concerning knowledge development and feedback from endogenous linkages. 
As the examples of mastitis and IGF-1 illustrate, knowledge as an input can mediate the 
definition process in a powerful way, preventing certain evaluative dimensions from 
opening-up and definitions from flourishing. EU decision-makers responded creatively to 
a timetable of knowledge development that they themselves could not always control by 
downgrading these causal claims about rbST until any claims to empirical validity could 
be made. Feedback from linked issues can also exert an independent force upon issue 
definition. The simultaneity of rbST with the hormone growth promoters issue and the 
wider debate stimulated by the Parliament on the place of empirical knowledge in 
product regulation created the cognitive boundaries within which the Commission and 
rbST became locked. 
 
Finally, in terms of applicability, the fusion of Haas’s epistemic communities and 
Pierson’s work on sequencing opens up new analytical possibilities for future empirical 
research in issue definition. While the findings presented here are intimately related to the 
rbST case, this analysis does have implications for a wide range of policy issues and for 
analysts in the EU and beyond. The idea of a definitional pecking order fits the 
contemporary reality of the crowded policy space, where multidimensional issues 
spillover, feedback and link-up to condition the control which decision-makers can exert 
over how an issue is defined. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 With acknowledgement and apologies to Anthony Downs (1972). 
2 I am grateful to one of my anonymous referees for suggesting this reference. 
3 The author conducted 38 semi-structured interviews with active and retired scientists, 
civil servants, politicians and interest group actors. 
4 I am grateful to one of my anonymous referees for suggesting this reference. 
5 At that time, over half of Community dairy farming was comprised of small holdings 
(i.e. ten cows or less) – a yield enhancer which would drive down prices would hit these 
farms hardest (EP 1988a, 1988b). 
6 This is now known as DG Enterprise and Industry. 
7 The value of rbST exports have been estimated at under $25million (Vogel 1995: 173). 
8 This has been adapted from a similar assertion made by Adler and Haas concerning the 
capacity of epistemic communities to create reality (1992: 381). 
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